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Can human neurological tests of consciousness be applied to octopus?
Commentary on Mather on Octopus Mind
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Abstract: If the anatomy, physiology and behaviour of a species differ substantially from our
own, as in the case of the octopus, can we infer that the species is unconscious? In the daily
clinical care of patients with disorders of consciousness we face many similar challenges: our
current approach with these patients - a combination of behavioural and brain imaging-based
assessments - might also be a viable route to investigating octopus consciousness.
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Mather (2019) examines the broad spectrum of behaviours and presumed cognitive abilities
of octopuses and wonders whether a mind (i.e., consciousness) can be inferred from some of
their capacities. Answering this question calls for operationalizing consciousness in this
species: the properties of consciousness need to be identified and the corresponding criteria
developed. There is not yet scientific agreement on a definition of consciousness and thus on
its properties, let alone criteria. Several criteria have been proposed (e.g., Seth, 2009). All
these criteria, however, have been developed anthropocentrically, starting from observations
of consciousness in our own species through subjective reports and comparing the resulting
data with those recorded in healthy human animals.
In trying to apply these criteria far from the human context in which they were
developed, various obstacles arise: for example, if we cannot find a functional equivalent of
the thalamocortical system in brain organizations different from our own, how can we
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interpret their structural and functional substrates? More generally, if the anatomy,
physiology, and behaviour of a species are substantially different from ours, can we conclude
that that species is unconscious (cf. Key, 2016, and accompanying commentary)?
Many of these challenges are similar to those we face every day in the care of patients
with disorders of consciousness (DOC) after severe brain damage. The relatives of these
patients usually come to our clinic to learn about the state of consciousness of their loved
ones. The diagnosis and prognosis we provide has major repercussions, as it determines
treatment choices, pain management and potential end-of-life decisions. Knowing the level
of consciousness of patients -- or of any sentient organism -- shapes our behaviour toward
them. We are ethically called upon to test and evaluate humans’ state of consciousness –and
ethical questions also arise with the octopus.
Currently, in our daily practice with DOC patients, we use a combination of diagnostic
approaches, bottom-up (behaviour-based assessment) and top-down (brain imaging-based
assessment). We examine diverse cognitive and noncognitive behaviours and residual brain
activity, combining a variety of analyses and methods (Gosseries et al. 2014). Although this
approach provides us with insight into the potential experiences and capabilities of DOC
patients, we still lack a baseline against which to evaluate these patients’ data, particularly
for the top-down approach. For example, in interpreting brain imaging data in patients we
use the healthy population as the standard. Yet, the brain of DOC patients may reorganise
after injury through brain plasticity (Mogensen, 2011). This altered reorganization may mean
that there is no longer direct standard against which patient data can be compared.
The same applies to the octopus and its decentralised nervous system which, despite
its organisation being so different from that of other animals, nevertheless seems suitable for
supporting remarkable cognitive capacities. These considerations invite us to consider the
possibility that consciousness comes not only in different quantities but also in different
“qualities”: as Godfrey-Smith (2016) points out, evolution may “build minds twice over”. That
is, one and the same function (consciousness) may take different forms, depending on
different environmental and social pressures.
The combination of top-down and bottom-up assessment that we currently use with
DOC patients may also be relevant to investigating the octopus mind. Although applying brain
imaging methods to octopuses is unquestionably difficult, some researchers have already
begun to take up the challenge (Jiang, 2015). If we could implement reliable brain imaging in
octopuses, some of the paradigms we currently use with DOC patients could be tested in this
cephalopod species. For example, if we could carry out consistent ERP studies (Annen et al.
2020)in octopuses, we could monitor their responses to a test we use daily with our patients
to diagnose their level of consciousness: the local/global auditory evoked potential paradigm
(Bekinschtein, 2009). In this “oddball” paradigm, two levels of regularities are established,
one at a local (within-trial) level and one at a global (across-trial) level. It is assumed that
specific EEG responses to disruptions of global regularities require active maintenance of
perceptual representations over time, indicating conscious processing, whereas responses to
disruptions of local regularities indicate automatic (unconscious) processing. To determine
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whether an octopus could detect a global irregularity would draw us into its cognition or
perhaps its consciousness1.
Such top-down measures, integrated with other behavioural tests -- carefully
designed to test complex cognition and not cognitive shortcuts, as Schnell & Vallortigara
(2019) point out – may help guide our interactions with nonverbal organisms and reduce
uncertainties about their (potential) cognition. In view of the current uncertainties regarding
behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of consciousness, we should remain cautious
in our inferences. Answering the question "What is it like to be an octopus?”, or “what is it
like to be a DOC patient?" may require not just an inference but an “imaginative leap”
(Godfrey-Smith, 2019).
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Although the link between active information maintenance and consciousness is still debated.
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